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Abstract: 
A number of influential studies have documented a considerable value premium for 
US stocks over long periods of time. Value stocks, defined as companies that trade at 
low price-earnings or price-book values, are reported to have given a higher mean 
return than growth stocks trading at high multiples. Outside the US, there is also 
robust evidence of a value premium for the UK, but otherwise the evidence is more 
uncertain due to data shortages. Studies of continental European and Asian markets 
are, for example, based on data that typically only covers 20 years of market history. 
The purpose of this paper is to report evidence for the Danish market using a 
consistent data set that extends over the period 1950-2008. On the basis of these data 
the paper investigates whether the value premium is a stylized fact or just a 
phenomenon that pops up every few decades only to disappear again. The results 
show that the Danish value premium exists and is significant over the long run. 
However, this paper also shows that the premium is not a simple constant but is 
volatile even across decades.  
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Introduction 
 
Graham and Dodd (1934) were among the first to argue that value companies, which 
are firms that trade at low price-earnings ratios in the stock market, are likely to offer 
investors a higher return than the more glamorous growth companies, usually trading 
at high multiples. Graham and Dodd therefore recommended investors “to look for 
value”, which is also the conclusion Keynes arrived at in 1938, when he took the 
opportunity to reflect on his investment career (Moggridge (1983) and Skidelsky 
(1992)).  
A number of influential studies have now also documented that there is a significant 
excess return on US value stocks over long time periods (Fama and French (1992 and 
2008), Davis, Fama and French (2000), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994)). Stocks with low price multiples and other measures of value are reported to 
have given a higher mean return than stocks with high valuation ratios and high 
growth (Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008)). These results are in line with previous 
findings by Basu (1997). Hence, the existence of a value premium, using a phrase 
from Fama and French (1992), is now a stylized fact in empirical finance.   
Notwithstanding that value stocks frequently outperform growth stocks, there are, of 
course, time periods with a negative premium. The US value premium disappeared 
for example in the late 1990s. Chan et al. (2000) argued in a paper written before the 
bursting of the bubble that this reflects that investors under the boom became too 
excited about growth stocks, including IT and internet stocks. Anticipating the 
dramatic fall in stock prices, they predicted that the excess return on value stocks 
would soon be reestablished. The evidence accumulated since then proves that they 
were right in this prediction as US value stocks posted higher returns than growth 
stocks during all years from 2000 to 2006. However, in 2007, the first year of the 
financial crisis, growth stocks again outperformed value stocks, albeit only for a short 
while as the US value premium reappeared in 2008.1
 
  
Outside the US, the evidence on the value premium is more uncertain due to data 
shortages. With a few exceptions, the studies of European and Asian markets are 
based on data sets which only extend over a few decades; see Risager (2009) for a 
survey.2
                                                 
1 The value premium equals 2 percent this year according to Russell, a well known and leading US provider of value 
and growth funds.  
 And since the value premium is volatile this renders the evidence less robust. 
2 Dimson et al. (2003) is an exception to the “rule of short samples” since their UK data extends over the period 1955-
2001. They show that the UK premium is high and surprisingly stable but add also some cautions as regards the 
extraction of the value premium in the small cap segment. Dimson et al. (2009) estimate the return difference between 
stocks with high dividend yields (value shares) and stocks with low dividend yields (growth shares). Over the period 
1900-2008, the mean annual return on the value portfolio exceeds the return on the growth portfolio by 3.1 %. A UK 
study by Gregory et al. (2001) also uses a data longer than the norm, that is, their data runs over the period 1975-1998 
and is also consistent with the existence of a premium, see also Gregory (2003). Most of the remaining literature is 
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For European and Asian markets there is a need to establish and analyze data that 
extends further back in time.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to report evidence on the Danish value premium. To this 
end I have collected stock market and accounting data for the period 1950-2008, that 
is, for more than half a century.  On the basis of these data the paper investigates 
whether the premium is a long-term characteristic of the Danish market or just a 
phenomenon that pops up now and then. The results show that there is also a value 
premium in the Danish market in the sense that value stocks on average perform 
better than growth stocks. However, the premium is by no means a simple constant. 
The premium varies a lot, and there are also several periods in which growth stocks 
do better than value companies.  I therefore also go into some details on the time 
periods in which growth companies are the best in class. 
 
The next section introduces the reader to the thinking of Graham and Dodd (1934), 
the fathers of the value tradition. I also briefly point attention to some of J.M. 
Keynes’s reflections in 1938 when he took the opportunity to look back at his 
investment career that began after he left the UK Treasury in 1919 for a position at 
King’s College, Cambridge. Next follows an outline of the data in section 2. Section 
3 presents and discusses the Danish value premium including its mean, volatility and 
occasional disappearance from the scene. Section 4 goes into more detail on the 
headwind to value investing over the years 2006 to 2008. Section 5 shows that value 
stocks on average post higher dividend yields than growth stocks. This section also 
analyzes why the dividend yield on both types of stocks has been much lower since 
1984. The last section concludes the paper. The data annex lists the data, which are 
hereby made publicly available. A companion paper discusses potential explanations 
of why there is a value premium in the first place (Risager (2010)). This is beyond the 
purpose of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
based on shorter samples. Arshanapalli et al. (1998) find a value premium in the majority of the 17 non-US countries 
they look at over the period 1975-1995. Bauman et al. (2001) document a value premium for 6 Pacific Rim countries 
over 1986-1996. Brouwer et al. (1997) looked at France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK over the period 1982-
1993 and also found evidence of a premium as did earlier work by Capaul et al. (1993), but their sample only included 
10 years.  Chan et al. (1991) find a value premium in Japan for the period 1971 to 1988. This work is extended by Cai 
(1997) to include the period until 1993, which therefore allows an interesting discussion of the years following the 
bursting of the bubble. In a sample of 12 developed countries over a 20-year period, Fama and French (1998) also 
establish evidence of a premium in 11 out of the 12 countries. Moreover, they also find a premium in emerging market 
economies but the sample length is only 9 years. The present paper is the first one which analyzes Danish data. I am not 
aware of any extensive analysis of the other Nordic markets  
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I. Introduction to Value Investing 
 
We begin with a brief outline of the investment philosophy outlined in Graham and 
Dodd (1934) “Security Analysis” and in later versions of this influential book.  In 
Security Analysis, and later in Graham (1949), it is argued that successful investors 
should avoid frequent trading of stocks since the market is basically unpredictable in 
particular in the near term regardless of which forecasting technique one is applying. 
In the 1949 version of “Security Analysis” it is put in this way: 
 
“We are skeptical of the ability to forecast with a fair degree of success the market 
behavior of individual issues over the near term future – whether he base his 
predictions upon the technical position of the market or upon the general outlook for 
business or upon the specific outlook for the individual companies” (Graham and 
Dodd (1949), p. 658). 
 
Instead of trying to outsmart the market in short-term trading behaviour, investors 
should instead either purchase a diversified portfolio of stocks at reasonable prices or 
try to play the value strategy: 
 
“Our preference is either for the simple purchase of a diversified list of primary 
issues at reasonable price levels”….”or else for the effort, by means of skilful 
security analysis, to find common stocks selling well below their intrinsic value” 
(Graham and Dodd, 1940, p. 403). 
 
Finding stocks that sell below their intrinsic value is the essence of the value 
investment philosophy. In the late 1930s, Keynes also became convinced about the 
merits of this approach. This is obvious from a memo he wrote in 1938 for the Estates 
Committee, Kings College. In this memo he reflects on his career as an investor. He 
begins the memo with a presentation of the returns on the investments he had made 
on behalf of King’s College. The analysis shows that he outperformed his 
benchmarks including Prudential, a large investor at the time. Following this, he goes 
on to reflect on the lessons that can be drawn from his extensive investment 
experiences, which also includes hectic speculation not only in stocks but also in 
commodities and currencies (Moggridge (1983) and Skidelsky (1992)). One of the 
key lessons that Keynes derives is that investors should go for:  
 
“A careful selection of a few investments (or a few types of investment) having 
regard to their cheapness in relation to their probable actual and potential intrinsic 
value over a period of years ahead and in relation to alternative investments at the 
time.” (Moggridge (1983, p. 107)). 
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Besides advising investors to search for value investments, Keynes also recommends 
that investors should only invest in a limited number of assets. He does not 
recommend a highly diversified portfolio, which in part is likely to reflect the high 
transaction costs at the time of writing and the lack of diversification instruments 
including mutual and exchange traded funds.3
 
 Moreover, Keynes emphasizes that 
investors should be patient: 
“A steadfast holding of these in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for 
several years, until either they have fulfilled their promise or it is evident that they 
were purchased on a mistake.” (Moggridge (1983, p. 107)). 
 
Towards the end of his career, Keynes had therefore become convinced about the 
merits of a value strategy. Smart investors should be patient and invest in stocks that 
look cheap relative to their intrinsic value. To invest in accordance with the value 
philosophy is, however, easier to say than to do since the notion of intrinsic value is 
hard to make operational as it depends on many factors. Therefore, neither Keynes 
nor Graham and Dodd offer a simple guide as on how to implement a value strategy 
in practice. This is left to the reader’s own analysis and judgment. This explains why 
value investors often differ substantially in terms of how they implement the value 
investment philosophy. 
The modern literature makes a short cut to the problem of identifying value stocks. In 
this literature, value stocks are simply those stocks that trade at low price earnings 
ratios or low price book values. Growth stocks, on the other hand, are stocks that 
trade at high multiples. As this study belongs to the modern tradition our 
classification of stocks into “value” and “growth” is therefore also entirely based on 
price multiples. An advantage of this is that we only use objective criteria. The 
analysis can therefore be replicated and does not depend on investor sentiment. In 
addition, it should be noted that there are well known value investment funds like 
Russell, an American fund provider, that are entirely based on objective criteria in 
line with the modern tradition; see Chan and Lakonishok (2004) and Risager (2009). 
The next section explains how the sample of Danish companies each year has been 
allocated into value and growth stocks.         
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 It also reflects his fundamental view that markets are inefficient and prices generally not right. It is therefore unwise to 
run a large portfolio since it takes to much effort to monitor each and every asset, which is a must when market prices 
are unreliable, see also Moggridge (1983). 
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II. Data and Portfolio Formation 
 
The sample covers the Danish large cap universe over the period 1950 to 2008. At the 
end of each year we select the 20 largest stocks by market capitalization.4 Next we 
split this universe into value and growth stocks using the price-earnings ratio as the 
sorting variable.5
 
 The value portfolio consists of the 10 stocks with the lowest P/E 
multiples, whereas the growth portfolio includes the 10 stocks with the highest P/E.  
Following end-of-year portfolio formation, returns are calculated for the following 
year assuming a one-year holding period. Returns include the capital gain and the 
dividend yield. Besides looking at one-year holding period returns, we also examine 
long-term returns.  As in Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1998) it is 
only stocks with positive earnings that enter the portfolios.6
 
 If firms later produce 
poor returns due to negative earnings, return calculations take this into account. 
Portfolios are formed on the basis of both current and trailing P/E multiples. Current 
P/E is defined as end-of-year P relative to reported earnings E over the year. This 
approach assumes that investors are able to make a forecast of earnings over the year 
since investors at year-ends only know earnings for the first 9 months and back in 
time only semi-annual earnings since it is only in the last 10 to 15 years that 
companies have released quarterly income statements. This approach can therefore be 
criticized for a look-ahead bias. We consider therefore also the case where the 
portfolio formation is based on annual earnings in the preceding year. Given that 
annual earnings reports are available around the end of the first quarter, this approach 
can certainly not be criticized for demanding too much information since the 
selection of stocks is based on information that has been around for about 9 months. 
However, even in this case the value strategy is paying off; cf. below. As noted, the 
current P/E approach can be said to be a bit too demanding in particular at the time 
when companies did not produce quarterly earnings reports since it assumes that 
investors can come up with a reliable forecast of annual earnings based only on semi-
annual company releases. Nowadays, it is, however, not that difficult to group the 
stocks into value and growth portfolios using only the first 3 quarter of earnings data. 
The hit ratio is almost 100 percent compared to using earnings for all 4 quarters. 
                                                 
4 In case firms have two share classes, we only include the liquid B shares. This approach minimizes the risk that the 
premium could reflect liquidity differences. From 1989 and onwards the universe is essentially the stocks in the Blue 
Chips price index first introduced in 1989 and now labeled the OMX C-20.  
 
5 The universe of stocks (and the two portfolios) is changing over time since we always work with the 20 largest 
companies. Alternative sorting measures, including price-book and price-cash flow measures, are unfortunately not 
available in our data set 
6 This does not lead to any biases since the premium is an unbiased estimate of the return difference between large value 
and growth stocks that belong to the set of stocks with positive earnings. When there are companies amongst the 20 
biggest that have negative earnings we take in new companies to make sure that we have 20 stocks each year. 
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Unlike the current P/E approach, the trailing P/E method is based on essentially 
outdated information. Hence, it seems reasonable to believe that a realistic outcome 
of pursuing a value strategy is in between the current and the trailing P/E approach. 
 
In order to give the reader information on the characteristics of the value and growth 
portfolios we present the first two portfolios in this sample. Table 1 shows the two 
portfolios, based on current P/Es and formed in December 1950. 
  
Table 1: The stock market menu in 1950 (end of year) 
 
     
    Low P/E High P/E 
 Price P/E P/E rank return Return 
Banking           
Den Danske Landmandsbank 138.5 17.17 18   -0.051 
Fyens Disconto Kasse 190 8.46 10 -0.147   
Handelsbanken 153 8.25 9 -0.085   
Privatbanken 157.25 7.32 6 -0.084   
Aarhus Privatbank 140 10.14 12   -0.043 
Industry           
Burmeister og Wain 101.75 2.35 1 0.229   
Carlsberg 300 18.62 19   -0.095 
De Danske Sukkerfabrikker  166.5 20.58 20   0.003 
De Forenede Papirfabrikker 202 13.26 15   -0.050 
NKT 321 13.14 14   0.027 
Nordisk Fjerfabrik 295 4.25 3 -0.006   
Store Nordiske Telegrafselskab 185 15.53 16   -0.081 
Superfos B 201 16.00 17   -0.055 
Aarhus Oliefabrik 223.5 7.86 7 -0.002   
Service and Trade           
Det Danske Luftfartselskab 46.5 5.44 4 -0.254   
Jydsk Telefon 127.25 10.20 13   -0.050 
Shipping           
ØK 202 9.40 11   0.158 
DFDS 194.25 8.00 8 0.040   
D/S Norden 282 4.06 2 0.106   
D/S Torm 274 5.50 5 0.029   
Value weighted portfolio return     -0.019 0.002 
 
 
What are the characteristics of these portfolios?  First, the value portfolio trades at a 
much lower P/E than the growth portfolio, namely, at a P/E equal to 6.2 compared to 
13.3 for the growth portfolio. That the growth portfolio is about twice as “expensive” 
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is the norm for the Danish market as shown by Table 2 below. This table also shows 
that the minimum P/E for the value portfolio over the sample is 2.5. Moreover, the 
P/E has never exceeded 15 on the value portfolio. By contrast, the mean value for the 
growth portfolio is 17.7. Second, the value portfolio includes three of the five banks. 
Thus, banks appear in both portfolios but over the whole sample there is a high 
propensity for banks to be value stocks. Third, by definition the value portfolio 
includes companies with the lowest P/Es and sometimes with incredibly low P/Es. In 
1950, the value portfolio includes Burmeister and Wain trading at a record low P/E at 
2.4. As the company returned 22.9 percent in 1951, it is possible that the company 
was undervalued in 1950. Fourth, there are companies in the 1950 portfolios that 
went bankrupt later e.g. Nordisk Fjerfabrik. In all cases with bankruptcy, the return to 
shareholders is -100 percent. The collapse of Nordisk Fjerfabrik in 1991 is therefore 
reducing the portfolio return with the company’s weight times -100 percent. In other 
words, the data is free of survivorship biases. Fifth, there are also companies in 1950 
that are still around. In 1950, the value portfolio includes for example the three 
shipping companies DFDS, Torm, and Norden. These firms are still traded unlike 
some of the others who have either disappeared or have changed name or importance 
as they have merged with other firms or have failed the test of the market place. An 
example of the latter is the East Asian Company (ØK), which at that time was the 
leading company unrivalled by any other Danish firm. ØK still exists but is today a 
much smaller company, and ØK is no longer in the large cap segment. 
 
Numbers in the two columns at the right of Table 1 are the returns of the individual 
firms in 1951. At the bottom we have the value weighted portfolio returns. As shown, 
the growth portfolio outperforms the value portfolio by a small margin in 1951, that 
is, the return on the growth portfolio equals 0.2 percent whilst the value strategy 
yields -1.9 percent. This could have led the impatient investor to quit the Graham and 
Dodd approach but that would have been unwise. As noted by Keynes, value 
investors should sometimes be patient.  
 
The returns in Table 1 are value weighted but for a small market there are some 
drawbacks with this approach. The most important is that returns are highly sensitive 
to 3-4 of the biggest companies’ fortunes in the market given that they account for a 
very large share of the portfolio. It can therefore be argued that investors (and 
returns) should have less exposure to these very big companies. That is why it is also 
useful to report equal weighted returns, cf. below. 
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Table 2: P/E for the value and growth portfolios, 1950-2007. 
   
  P/E Value Portfolio P/E Growth Portfolio 
Mean 7.8 17.7 
Median 7.3 15.3 
Minimum                      2.5 (1983) 7.3 (1980) 
Maximum                       14.8 (1998) 50.6 (2000) 
 
 
 
III. Statistics on the Danish value premium  
 
Table 3 summarizes the returns on the value and the growth portfolio over the entire 
period 1951-2008. Regardless of how the value and the growth portfolios are formed 
the mean value premium is positive. In other words, value investing has paid off also 
in the Danish market. 
 
The mean value premium equals 4.4 percent when the portfolio formation is based on 
current P/E ratios and when returns are value weighted. In case of equal weighting 
the premium increases to 6.3 percent. It is important to note that the premium is 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. In the value (equal) 
weighted case the t-statistic equals 2.48 (4.10). Moreover, since the market return is 
defined as the return on all large caps, value investing also beats the return on the 
market portfolio.7
 
   
The premium declines by a significant amount when stocks are sorted on the basis of 
trailing P/E ratios.8
                                                 
7 Note that this result is not likely to be turned around by an introduction of trading costs, which is omitted in this paper 
as well as in the literature with a few exceptions (cf. below). Trading costs will affect both the market and the value 
portfolio (through rebalancing and through exit and entry of new companies) but it is unlikely that they will weigh so 
much more on the value portfolio that the excess return to the market will disappear. Note also in this connection that 
the market portfolio is of double size relative to the value portfolio. Dimson et al. (2003) discusses the importance of 
trading costs for extracting a premium in the UK small cap segment.   
 This result is by no means obvious. It shows that the negative 
impact of using outdated earnings data is felt most on the value portfolio and least on 
the growth portfolio. This reflects that growth investors now pick stocks that are not 
at their max price-earnings levels, which is associated with the lowest subsequent 
return. For growth investors it is an advantage of investing on the basis of outdated 
information since growth investors hereby avoid picking the stocks with their highest 
price-earnings multiples, which on average is associated with the lowest returns.     
8 The premium equals 2.5 and 2.1 percent in the value (equal) weighted case. Note in this case equal weighting 
produces the lowest premium.   
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Table 3: Returns for value, growth and the market, 1951-2008 
 
   
Current P/E 
(value weighted)    
    Market Value Growth Value Premium   
 Mean 0.125 0.148 0.105 0.044  
 Std. 0.251 0.278 0.244 0.134  
  t(Mean) 3.79 4.07 3.26 2.48   
       
   
Current P/E 
(equal weighted)    
    Market Value Growth Value Premium   
 Mean 0.146 0.183 0.120 0.063  
 Std. 0.283 0.299 0.252 0.117  
  t(Mean) 3.92 4.67 3.63 4.10   
       
   
Trailing P/E 
(value weighted)    
    Market Value Growth Value Premium   
 Mean 0.124 0.139 0.113 0.026  
 Std. 0.253 0.292 0.244 0.162  
  t(Mean) 3.69 3.58 3.49 1.20   
       
   
Trailing P/E 
(equal weighted) 
 
  
    Market Value Growth Value Premium   
 Mean 0.148 0.155 0.132 0.022  
 Std. 0.287 0.299 0.258 0.159  
  t(Mean) 3.91 3.91 3.86 1.07  
 
 
We have now discussed the mean value premium. Let us then turn to the movement 
of the premium over time. The value premium based on current P/E multiples is 
displayed in Figure 1. As shown, the premium is positive and substantial in the 
majority of the 10-year periods. It is only in the 1990s that growth stocks produce a 
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marginally higher return than value stocks. In this sense the premium looks like a 
stylized fact even though the premium is volatile even across decades.  
 
The highest premium is recorded in the 1980s with a mean annual premium at 14.7 
percent. The 1980s are therefore the golden age for Danish value investors. The 
lowest premium is in the 1990s with an annual mean at -0.9 percent. A banking sector 
crisis in the early 1990s and a strong investor appetite for growth stocks in the late 
1990s are key explanations of the low premium in this decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the 1990s, the value premium recovers in the first 6 years of the new 
millennium. However, during the period 2006 to 2008, markets have not been kind to 
value investors, which we discuss in greater detail later. 
 
Figure 2 displays the value premium when returns are equal weighted. In this case the 
premium is in positive territory in all decades including in the 1990s. Otherwise, the 
behavior is similar to what we have already noted. The 1980s are the golden age for 
value investing. The premium is under attack in the early 1990s and in the late 1990s. 
We have a strong recovery in the beginning of the new millennium and also strong 
headwind to value investing in the last couple of years.  
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Figure 1: 1-year and 10-year annualized value premium 
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So far we have assumed a 1-year buy and hold strategy. Let us now assume investors’ 
holding period is longer. Figure 3 shows the case with a 3-year holding period.9
                                                 
9 We assume that investors hold the portfolios (same stocks) in 3 years. Figure 3 is based on overlapping portfolio 
returns. Note the last portfolio formed is in 2005 as we have returns up to 2008.  
 This 
does not change the basic insight: Value strategies outperform in general and now 
also in the 1990s but only by a small margin in this decade. 
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Figure 2: 1-year and 10-year annualized value premium 
(equal weighted)
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IV. Markets have not been kind to value investors in recent years 
 
The disappointing performance of Danish value stocks since 2006 deserves some 
comments. Let us begin with the 2006 outcome.10
                                                 
10 For simplicity we focus only on the portfolio selection based on current P/E multiples. We get broadly the same 
conclusions for the trailing P/E case.  
 In this year, the value portfolio 
posted a return of 12.2 percent compared to 26.3 percent on the growth portfolio. The 
moderate return on the value portfolio is essentially due to a poor performance of a 
single but very large company A.P. Moller-Maersk. Due to difficulties in integrating 
the newly acquired shipping company P&O Nedloyd into Maersk Line, the company 
went through a hard time, which also resulted in a poor stock market performance. 
Thus, the stock posted a return of –17.6 percent, and with a weight close to 30 
percent in the value portfolio this had a significant effect on the portfolio return.  Had 
we instead used equal weighting, the value premium would have been positive and as 
high as + 9 percent illustrating the point that the negative premium is essentially due 
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
1951-2006 1951-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005
Value Growth
Figure 3: Average 3-year returns on value and growth 
portfolios, 1950-2005 (value weighted)
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to one very large company.11
 
 It would therefore be misleading to say that value 
investing in general lost its attractiveness in 2006. 
By contrast, the poor performance of value stocks in 2007 is broad based as 5 out of 
10 value stocks are posting negative returns. Altogether, the return on value equals – 
4.9 percent. Growth stocks perform very well this year.  The overall return equals 28 
percent led by Vestas, a world leader in wind turbines, with a return at 118.6 percent 
benefiting strongly from the high oil price and the increased political focus on 
alternative energy. Novo Nordisk, a market leader in insulin production, is another 
high performer this year posting a return equal to 44.2 percent. As the value premium 
in the equal weighted case equals -9.1 percent, it is fair to say that 2007 is a year in 
which value investing is underperforming. 
 
In 2008 the value premium remains depressed at -20.3 percent.12
 
 Like in 2007 the 
poor performance of value stocks is broad based. The poor performance of value 
reflects, amongst other things, the financial crisis which was very tough on financial 
stocks in particular (which have a large weight in the value portfolio). The worst 
performer this year is Danske Bank with a return at record low -69.7 percent. The 
better performance of the growth portfolio is mainly due to pharmaceutical stocks, 
including especially Novo Nordisk. Pharmaceutical stocks outperform the market 
during the crisis reflecting their defensive nature.  
In sum, it is correct to say that 2007 and 2008 are years with a strong 
underperformance of value stocks. The financial crisis has taken its toll on financial 
stocks in particular and this explains the poor return on the value portfolio in 2007. 
This parallels the findings for the US. In the US, the value premium is also negative 
in 2007 but value stocks actually outperform growth stocks by a small margin in 
2008, see Risager (2009). Needless to say, we do not know whether the negative 
value premium in recent years is the start of a new trend. However, since it is hard to 
identify factors that should have led to a fundamental shift in paradigm it is 
conceivable that the bad years for value investors will be followed by a number of 
good years that eventually will offset the bad years. Indeed, this would be consistent 
with the way history has played out since 1950.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 AP. Moller – Maersk is not in the data prior to 2003 (when the company was created as a merger of 
Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg and Dampskibsselskabet 1912). 
12 The premium when stocks are equal weighted equals - 5.4 percent. 
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V. Value stocks give higher dividends but the significance of dividends has 
declined for both types of stocks 
 
Before we conclude the paper let us outline yet another difference between value and 
growth stocks. Results show that value companies typically pay higher dividends 
than growth companies. Thus, the average dividend yield is about one percentage 
point higher on value than on growth stocks. This is the case for both the equal and 
value weighted portfolios, see Table 4. In other words, about 25 percent of the value 
premium is due to higher dividend yields on value stocks. The higher dividend yield 
is a fairly regular phenomenon in the sense that value stocks’ dividend yields exceed 
the yields on growth stocks in more than 75 percent of the years.13
 
 This is interesting 
in view of the fact that it is only companies that do reasonably well that pay 
dividends to shareholders. Without going into a discussion about the causes of the 
premium this insight indicates that there is more to the value premium than a pure 
“risk” explanation. Finally, the fact that value stocks offer shareholders the highest 
dividend yields concurs well with findings for other countries (Dimson et al. (2009)).  
 
Table 4: Mean dividend yields for value and growth portfolios, 1951-2008 
 
 1951-2008 1951-1983 1984-2008 
 Value Growth Value Growth Value Growth 
Equal 
weighted 0.044 0.035 0.058 0.050 0.026 0.016 
Value 
weighted 0.046 0.035 0.059 0.048 0.029 0.017 
Note: Value weighted dividend yields are based on current P/E classification of stocks. 
 
 
  
Dividend yields on both types of stocks display a sharp decline in 1984. On the value 
portfolio the dividend yield declines from 5.9 percent (over 1951-1983) to 3 percent 
(over 1984-2008). On the growth portfolio the yield declines from 4.8 percent to 1.7 
percent. The sharp decline is illustrated in Figure 4. Dividend yields have never since 
then recovered to previous levels.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 To be precise in 78 percent (83 percent) of the years in the case of equal (value weighted returns) under the current 
P/E method.  
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Why do we have this sharp decline in dividend yields? Is it because companies 
suddenly reduce their dividend payments (the numerator) say in response to changes 
in the tax treatment of dividends or is it due to sharp increases in equity prices (the 
denominator) driven by other factors? The answer is that the decline by and large is 
due to soaring equity prices in 1983. In this year, equity prices increase by more than 
100 percent on average. And since the 1984 dividend yield uses end 1983 prices in 
the denominator it is easy to show that it is the jump in prices that explains the drop 
in yields.14
 
  
The soaring equity prices are normally attributed to domestic factors. A successful 
stabilization of the Danish economy led to a decline in interest rates by more than 7 
percentage points from fall 1982 to mid 1983 and this stabilization also helped to 
improve the outlook for business in general and therefore also the outlook for 
companies’ earnings (Andersen and Risager (1988) and Dornbusch (1989)). In 
addition, the stabilization is likely to have stimulated the demand for risky assets as 
investors gained more confidence in the Danish economy. Moreover, pension funds 
                                                 
14 This can be verified by relating the payouts in 1984 to end-1982 prices. This exercise produces pseudo yields of about 
the size observed in the past. In other words, it is the rise in equity prices that has led to a new plateau for yields. It is 
not a change in dividends in DKK. 
0
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Figure 4: Dividend yields on value and growth portfolios, 
1951-2008 (value weighted)
Dividend yield 2006 on value 
portfolio when TDC is included
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were also given additional incentives to invest in shares. This is also likely to have 
played a role. However, there were not any changes in the tax-treatment of 
companies’ dividends. Companies therefore continue to pay about the same in 
dividends in 1984 as they did in previous years. From a theoretical perspective this 
supports the Lintner (1956) view of conservatism, that is, companies’ overriding 
dividend policy is first and foremost to maintain stability in payouts and to avoid 
sharp cuts in dividends since this is likely to signal fundamental weaknesses. Target 
dividends are therefore determined by companies’ long-term earnings capacity.15 
Actual dividends adjust slowly towards this target. Sharp changes in equity prices do 
therefore not lead to changes in payouts, ceteris paribus.16
 
   
The final point is the unusually high dividend yield in 2006 also depicted in Figure 3. 
In 2006, 88.2 percent of the Danish telephone company TDC is acquired by Nordic 
Telephone Company, a capital fund owned by 5 partner funds. As a result of the 
change in ownership, dividend payments on the TDC share are skyrocketing 
reflecting the new owners’ immediate attempt to cash in on their acquisition.17
 
 The 
new owners of the company managed to take out massive amounts of cash reserves 
though they did not succeed in delisting the company as this attempt was frustrated 
by ATP, the largest Danish institutional investor. ATP refused to accept the share 
price offer which meant that the company did not get the critical 90 percent required 
to delist the company following an offer to minority share holders. TDC is therefore 
still listed on the stock exchange though with a significantly reduced free float.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) contain an interesting analysis of the determinants of target dividends across different 
type of firms. Companies with e.g. a large and dominant shareholder tend to pay less in dividends than companies with 
lots of small shareholders. 
16 To maintain an unchanged dividend yield would have required a massive float of new stocks to finance such a policy, 
a theoretical possibility but unlikely to be implemented in practice as this incident also confirms. 
 
17 On April 11 2006, dividends of DKK 219.50 per share, totaling DKK 43,481million were paid out by TDC. And on 
June 29, 2006, dividends of DKK 4.35 per share, totaling DKK 862m , were paid out in addition to the amount already 
paid out (TDC Annual Report (2006), p. 4). Altogether, this lifts the value portfolio’s dividend yield to almost 12 
percent in 2006.  
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VI. Concluding Comments 
 
There is by now a large international literature which has shown that value stocks 
produce higher returns than growth stocks not only in the US and the UK but also in 
other markets over long periods of time. Stocks with low price-earnings multiples, 
price-book values and other measures of value are found to have given a higher mean 
return than stocks with high valuation ratios and high asset growth.  
 
This literature therefore confirms the basic thrust of Graham and Dodd (1934) and 
Keynes who also became convinced about the merits of the value approach in the late 
1930s following a hectic investment career (Moggridge (1983) and Skidelsky 
(1992)). However, since the results for the Asian and European markets (excluding 
the UK) are based on short samples often with not more than 20 years of data there is 
a need for analyzing this issue using data that extends much longer back in time. 
 
This paper has researched the Danish value premium over the period 1950 to 2008. 
The long sample enables us to test whether the premium is a stylized fact or just a 
phenomenon that pops every now and then. The sample covers the Danish large cap 
universe, which every year is divided into value and growth stocks using the price-
earnings ratio as the sorting variable. The value portfolio consists of the 10 stocks 
with the lowest P/E multiples, whereas the growth portfolio includes the 10 stocks 
with the highest P/E. The average P/E is 7.8 for the value portfolio and 17.7 for the 
growth portfolio. These numbers show that there is a considerable valuation 
difference between the two types of portfolios.  
 
The results show that Danish value stocks outperform growth stocks due to higher 
capital appreciation and higher dividends. The mean value premium is in the range 2-
6 percent per year depending on the nature of the portfolio selection. Had we only 
worked with a short sample like e.g. in Fama and French (1998), who studied 
developed equity markets over the period 1975-1995, the estimate of the premium 
would have been much higher, underscoring the need of long time series to reduce 
the risk of biases. As regards the movement of the premium over time, the evidence 
shows that the premium is positive and substantial in the majority of the 10-year 
periods. In this sense the premium looks like a stylized fact even though the premium 
is volatile even across decades. There are also a number of consecutive years in 
which the growth stocks are the best in class. Thus, the premium is negative in the 
early 1990s, due to a banking sector crisis, and in the late 1990s, due to high investor 
appetite for growth stocks. In the new millennium, value stocks outperform every 
year until 2006. In 2007 and 2008, value stocks underperform due to the financial 
crisis that took its toll in particular on financial stocks, with a large weight in the 
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value portfolio. In spite of the recent headwind to value investing the premium 
remains in positive territory in the 21st century.  
 
Finally, let us briefly discuss three extensions. First, it would be useful to know 
whether the Danish premium is larger if stocks are sorted according to the book-to-
market or the cash-flow yield. In general,  this is the case for the US (Davis et al. 
(2000) and Lakonishok et al. (1994)). However, as the data are not available and have 
to be hand collected this is an entire new project. Second, on the basis of the evidence 
laid out in this study the next step should be to analyze potential explanations of the 
premium. On this it should be noted that the literature offers two explanations, 
namely, the risk based explanation and the behavioral finance explanation. According 
to the latter, investors often get too excited about the prospects of growth companies. 
This leads investors to forget that even the most fantastic growth company can be 
purchased at a price that is too high. However, when investors collectively realize 
that the pricing of these companies is too optimistic relative to the firms’ ability to 
generate earnings, the correction sets in. It is due to this that many growth companies 
disappoint long-term investors according to behavioural finance (Barberis and Thaler 
(2003), and LaPorta et al. (1997)). This issue is left for future research using the data 
in this paper including the earnings data that allow us to test the earnings 
disappointment hypothesis put forward in this literature. Third, while there is long 
time series evidence on the market performance of stocks and bonds in some of the 
other Nordic countries (Hansson and Frennberg (l992) and Klovland (2004)) I am not 
aware of any detailed studies of the value premium. It would be interesting to 
research the other Nordic markets on this issue.  
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VII. Data Annex 
 
1-Year Stock Returns (Current P/E) 
 
 
Low P/E High P/E Low P/E High P/E 
 
Low P/E High P/E Low P/E High P/E 
 
Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
 
Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
1951 -0,017 -0,023 -0,019 0,002 1980 0,243 0,086 0,211 0,041 
1952 0,089 0,039 0,099 0,032 1981 0,307 0,305 0,358 0,224 
1953 0,087 0,090 0,093 0,093 1982 0,281 0,190 0,381 -0,047 
1954 0,158 0,110 0,170 0,120 1983 1,452 1,025 1,194 0,851 
1955 0,315 0,192 0,347 0,172 1984 -0,101 -0,212 -0,095 -0,347 
1956 0,237 0,238 0,210 0,256 1985 0,540 0,409 0,362 0,383 
1957 -0,020 -0,089 -0,017 -0,114 1986 -0,153 -0,219 -0,180 -0,190 
1958 0,271 0,160 0,239 0,183 1987 -0,045 -0,033 -0,007 -0,079 
1959 0,204 0,274 0,190 0,256 1988 0,837 0,739 0,739 0,532 
1960 0,029 0,062 0,027 0,086 1989 0,290 0,285 0,130 0,254 
1961 0,044 0,040 0,041 0,029 1990 -0,124 -0,137 -0,079 -0,157 
1962 0,136 -0,016 0,148 -0,014 1991 0,230 0,218 0,119 0,324 
1963 0,150 0,156 0,166 0,183 1992 -0,192 -0,169 -0,210 -0,193 
1964 0,117 0,070 0,087 0,076 1993 0,433 0,418 0,354 0,330 
1965 0,117 0,076 0,137 0,084 1994 -0,002 -0,127 -0,045 -0,141 
1966 0,029 -0,026 0,055 -0,027 1995 0,290 0,059 0,197 0,136 
1967 0,206 -0,103 0,017 -0,120 1996 0,276 0,255 0,250 0,306 
1968 0,231 0,141 0,195 0,134 1997 0,595 0,283 0,577 0,498 
1969 0,024 0,095 0,024 0,087 1998 -0,016 0,267 -0,011 0,157 
1970 0,033 -0,059 -0,011 -0,048 1999 0,212 0,024 0,028 0,009 
1971 0,080 0,002 0,039 0,012 2000 0,271 0,493 0,318 0,100 
1972 1,012 0,791 1,086 0,976 2001 -0,137 -0,122 -0,110 -0,067 
1973 0,043 0,032 -0,039 0,116 2002 -0,171 -0,171 -0,171 -0,259 
1974 -0,138 -0,234 -0,141 -0,217 2003 0,389 0,146 0,370 0,015 
1975 0,473 0,427 0,391 0,386 2004 0,302 0,314 0,226 0,217 
1976 0,020 0,004 -0,016 0,021 2005 0,531 0,315 0,438 0,312 
1977 0,237 0,032 0,117 0,001 2006 0,310 0,222 0,123 0,262 
1978 0,109 -0,019 0,086 -0,096 2007 0,004 0,067 -0,047 0,267 
1979 -0,029 -0,016 0,011 0,007 2008 -0,489 -0,430 -0,547 -0,341 
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1-Year Stock Returns (Trailing P/E) 
 
 
Low P/E High P/E Low P/E High P/E 
 
Low P/E High P/E Low P/E High P/E 
 
Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
 
Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
1952 0,087 0,042 0,094 0,054 1981 0,200 0,411 0,213 0,350 
1953 0,084 0,093 0,091 0,095 1982 0,288 0,077 0,350 -0,058 
1954 0,167 0,100 0,174 0,113 1983 1,334 1,142 1,151 0,853 
1955 0,315 0,192 0,324 0,178 1984 -0,131 -0,152 -0,120 -0,332 
1956 0,279 0,197 0,287 0,201 1985 0,614 0,337 0,557 0,204 
1957 -0,055 -0,054 -0,049 -0,094 1986 -0,160 -0,212 -0,169 -0,201 
1958 0,293 0,138 0,301 0,148 1987 0,039 -0,108 0,048 -0,167 
1959 0,217 0,261 0,186 0,267 1988 0,909 0,437 0,861 0,436 
1960 0,039 0,052 0,055 0,057 1989 0,192 0,380 0,109 0,254 
1961 0,021 0,063 0,017 0,053 1990 -0,241 -0,033 -0,176 -0,054 
1962 0,097 0,022 0,102 0,025 1991 0,076 0,230 0,024 0,296 
1963 0,134 0,171 0,159 0,185 1992 -0,189 -0,106 -0,224 -0,067 
1964 0,095 0,092 0,079 0,084 1993 0,406 0,309 0,486 0,270 
1965 0,133 0,061 0,147 0,042 1994 0,004 -0,096 -0,050 -0,137 
1966 -0,007 -0,040 0,007 0,011 1995 0,286 0,004 0,242 0,003 
1967 0,138 -0,071 -0,037 -0,058 1996 0,323 0,250 0,276 0,273 
1968 0,231 0,120 0,200 0,143 1997 0,537 0,335 0,615 0,498 
1969 0,037 0,082 0,042 0,054 1998 -0,038 0,244 0,115 0,008 
1970 -0,057 -0,005 -0,045 -0,021 1999 -0,003 0,239 -0,052 0,058 
1971 0,074 0,007 0,049 0,013 2000 0,184 0,580 0,091 0,363 
1972 0,892 0,911 1,057 1,011 2001 -0,200 -0,066 -0,151 -0,060 
1973 -0,015 0,090 -0,057 0,132 2002 -0,174 -0,230 -0,186 -0,298 
1974 -0,212 -0,160 -0,199 -0,152 2003 0,486 0,016 0,403 -0,024 
1975 0,514 0,386 0,367 0,411 2004 0,222 0,349 0,185 0,269 
1976 -0,028 0,052 -0,042 0,056 2005 0,395 0,497 0,380 0,510 
1977 0,172 0,074 0,054 0,050 2006 0,235 0,234 0,081 0,257 
1978 0,063 -0,035 -0,018 -0,018 2007 -0,128 -0,033 -0,093 0,160 
1979 -0,044 -0,041 -0,003 -0,014 2008 -0,484 -0,454 -0,543 -0,342 
1980 0,161 0,147 0,138 0,079 
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